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I. INTRODUCTION
Nestled in the shadow of Charlotte, North Carolina, a
banking hub for Wachovia' and Bank of America, is Citizens
South Bank of Gastonia 2, North Carolina? Citizens South has
total assets of less than $900 million and, like most community
banks across the nation, is feeling the effects of the slow real estate
market.4 Unlike many of its much larger counterparts, however,
Citizens South is generating positive headlines Through its
participation in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),
Citizens South has instituted a home lending program, the CPP
Mortgage Program, designed to stimulate the local housing
market.6 The CPP Mortgage Program makes credit available to
local consumers at a low price while enabling Citizens South to
turn nonperforming construction loans into home mortgages!
Although the landscape of community banking is changing
rapidly, Citizens South illustrates that innovative programs and
products like the CPP Mortgage Program can address concerns
arising from the recent financial crisis and act as a blueprint for
successful community banking going forward.8
Part II of this Note will provide a brief overview of the
community banking environment today.9 Part III will give a brief
1. Now owned by Wells Fargo & Company. Wachovia Company Information,
http://www.wachovia.com (follow "company information" hyperlink) (last visited
Jan. 21, 2010).
2. The author's father is currently a board member of Citizens South Bank.
3. For institutional information regarding Citizens South Bank, see Office of
Thrift Supervision Institution Search: Citizens South Bank, http://www.ots.treas.gov/
?p=InstitutionSearch&iid=02449 (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra p. 378 and notes 124-131.
6. See infra pp. 374-75 and notes 97-106.
7. See infra pp. 374-75 and notes 97-106.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra pp. 362-66.
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overview of TARP, an overview of the Capital Purchase Program
(CPP), and examine the role the CPP has played in community
banking during the current economic crisis.10 Part IV will explore
Citizens South's participation in TARP and its use of TARP funds
to create a unique lending program."
II. COMMUNITY BANKING ENVIRONMENT TODAY
Some of the buzz-words surrounding the economic climate
in the fall of 2008 were "systemic risk" and "too big to fail," but
community banks, which do not pose systemic risk and are not too
big to fail, face different challenges and opportunities as a result of
the financial crisis.
12
During 2009, the United States experienced a dramatic
spike in the number of bank failures.13 More than 140 banks failed
during the past year." By comparison, only twenty-six banks failed
in 2008, and only twenty-seven banks failed from 2000 to 2007
combined. 5 Many analysts expect that these numbers will increase
further during the next several years as small banks deal with
losses from residential and commercial real estate loans. 6 The
poor financial health of many community banks can be traced to
two primary factors: (1) the condition of the local economy in
10. See infra pp. 366-73.
11. See infra pp. 374-80.
12. See Robert Barba, Why Illinois Is Becoming Midwest's Failure Hub, AM.
BANKER, July 2, 2009; Chairman Ben. S. Bernanke, Address at the Independent
Community Bankers of America's National Convention and Techworld: The
Financial Crisis and Community Banking (Mar. 20, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke2009O320a.htm); Alain
Sherter, Reckless Lending by Small Banks Worsened Financial Crisis, BNET, Aug.
18, 2009, http://industry.bnet.com/financial-services/10002396/reckless-small-banks-
worsened-financial-crisis/; Michael Sisk, Crisis Creates Opportunity for Small-Bank
Programs, AM. BANKER, Mar. 11, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 4576571.
13. See FDIC Failed Bank List, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/bank
list.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2010)[hereinafter Failed Bank List].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Eric Dash, Pathology of a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 19, 2009,
1:56 AM) at B1, available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/pathology-
of-a-financial-crisis!; Eric Dash, Failures of Small Banks Grow, Straining ED..C.,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/
business/economy/i lbanks.html.
[Vol. 14
INNOVATIVE USE OF TARP FUNDS
which the banks operate; and (2) the risks taken by individual
banks in an effort to promote rapid growth.17
The case of Security Savings Bank in Henderson, Nevada,
exemplifies the reasons that many banks across the United States
have failed.' 8 In its report by the Inspector General, the FDIC
outlined the causes of Security Savings Bank's failure:
[Blank management did not adequately control the
risks associated with its business strategy that
focused on (1) rapid asset growth, (2) significant
concentrations in ADC [Acquisition, Development,
and Construction] loans, (3) investments in lower-
quality mortgage-backed securities, and (4) reliance
on high-cost core deposits and volatile non-core
funding. The deteriorating housing market in areas
where Security held most of its loans led to
significant loan and security losses that eroded the
bank's capital and strained liquidity.'9
As with many community banks across the country,
Security Savings Bank was vulnerable to failure because it engaged
in risky banking practices such as maintaining high concentrations
of certain types of loans, investing in high-risk securities, and
relying on high-cost deposits.20  When economic conditions
worsened, banks like Security Savings Bank were significantly
affected because they were too heavily invested in the quickly
deteriorating housing market as well as unreliable sources of
funding like "lower-quality mortgage-backed securities[,] ... high-
cost core deposits[,] and volatile non-core funding.
' 21
17. See infra pp. 364-66 and notes 22-36.
18. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REP. No.
AUD-09-029, MATERIAL Loss REVIEW OF SECURITY SAVINGS BANK, HENDERSON,
NEV. (2009) [hereinafter MATERIAL LOSS].
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id. at 3.
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A. Local Economic Conditions
Community banks were vulnerable not only because of
risky banking practices, but also due to disproportionate
participation in commercial real estate lending which tied the
fortunes of small banks to the economies of the communities they
serve.12 Although small to medium-sized banks hold only a small
percentage of banking assets as a whole, they own about half of
the banking industry's commercial real estate loans.23
The downturn in the real estate markets has been the
biggest local economic factor affecting the health of community
banks. 4 The real estate boom that characterized the early part of
the decade ended dramatically, and many community banks have
failed as a result.2' For example, numerous bank failures occurred
in areas like California, Florida, and Georgia where, prior to the
26economic crisis, the real estate market was booming. In fact,
bank failures in those states account for more than half of the bank
failures in the United States in 2009.27
In contrast, some banks, such as Iowa Trust and Savings
Bank (Iowa Trust), have felt only minor effects of the economic
downturn due to a strong local economy. 8 Iowa Trust is located in
an area largely reliant on farming where the high prices of corn
have stimulated the local economy and actually improved Iowa
Trust's business.' 9 The contrast between the numerous bank
failures in California, Florida, and Georgia due to faltering local
22. See TARP Oversight: Is TARP Working for Main Street?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong.
(2009) (statement of Dean Baker, Ph.D., Co-director, Center for Economic Policy
and Research); Barba, Why Illinois is Becoming Midwest's Failure Hub, supra note
12; Patrice Hill, Small banks fail in big numbers, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/21/small-banks-fail-in-big-numbers/;
Community Banks Insulated From Financial Crisis (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 7,
2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=95484254.
23. See Dash, Failures of Small Banks Grow, Straining F.D.I. C., supra note 16.
24. See Failed Bank List, supra note 13; Community Banks Insulated From
Financial Crisis, supra note 22.
25. See Community Banks Insulated From Financial Crisis, supra note 22.
26. See Failed Bank List, supra note 13; Community Banks Insulated From
Financial Crisis, supra note 22.
27. See Failed Bank List, supra note 13.
2& See Community Banks Insulated From Financial Crisis, supra note 22.
29. See id.
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economies and the relative health of banks like Iowa Trust,
illustrates the enormous impact that local economic health can
have on community banks.
B. Efforts Aimed at Rapid Growth
Concentrated efforts to grow asset bases rapidly is another
reason why many community banks have failed.3° For example,
because banks in the slow-growing Midwest were unable to
participate in the real estate boom occurring in other areas of the
country, banks in Illinois turned to other investment opportunities
in their search for growth.31 Many of these banks failed due to
investments in risky securities that subsequently saw significant
losses due to a rapid decline in investment value.32 Although other
factors contributed to bank failures in Illinois, many community
banks, under pressure from demands for rapid growth, abandoned
their traditionally conservative banking practices in search of big
returns on investments.33
Though risky banking practices may not have
foreshadowed the number of bank failures occurring today, their
confluence with other elements of the financial crisis, such as the
stagnant housing market, has had a disparate effect on community
banks. Some community banks that employed conservative
banking practices prior to the crisis have flourished because many
consumers left larger financial institutions for smaller banks.
34
Community banks have also benefitted from capital infusions from
government-sponsored liquidity programs such as the CPP.3 5 By
contrast, banks that sought high returns and rapid asset growth at
30. See MATERIAL Loss, supra note 18, at 3; Barba, Why Illinois is Becoming
Midwest's Failure Hub, supra note 12; Dash, Pathology of a Crisis, supra note 16
(noting relaxed lending standards).
31. See Barba, Why Illinois is Becoming Midwest's Failure Hub, supra note 12.
32. See id.
33. See id. Other major factors contributing to bank failures in Illinois include: 1)
the slow real estate market that the suburbs outside of Chicago are experiencing; 2)
more banks are headquartered in Illinois (652) than any other state. Id.
34. See Dash, Failures of Small Banks Grow, Straining F.D.I.C., supra note 16;
Sisk, supra note 12.
35. See Dash, Failures of Small Banks Grow, Straining F.D.I.C., supra note 16;
Sisk, supra note 12; infra pp. 8-16 and notes 42-92 (discussing the Capital Purchase
Program).
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the expense of security have floundered and often failed due to
toxic assets on their books and the absence of government bail-
outs.
3 6
III. BACKGROUND ON TARP FUNDS AND THE CAPITAL
PURCHASE PROGRAM
On October 3, 2008, the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) was passed in response to the
deteriorating economic climate in the United States.37 EESA gave
the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to establish the TARP
under the newly created Office of Financial Stability.38 The
purpose of TARP was to "purchase, and to make and fund
commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial
institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by the
Secretary., 39 The term "troubled assets" was defined to include
"any... financial instrument that the Secretary... determines the
purchase of which is necessary to promote financial market
stability., 40 This broad language eventually formed the basis for
the creation of the CPP, a program within TARP that provided
banks with inexpensive capital infusions through the Treasury's
purchase of banks' preferred stock.41
36. See Robert Barba, Making a Case to Give Tarp to Strugglers, AM. BANKER,
May 18, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 9314910; Mike Ferullo, Capital Purchase
Program: Geithner Announces Small Banks Eligible For More Capital Investments
From Treasury, BANKING DAILY, May 5, 2009, available at 5/16/2009 BBD d16;
Eugene A. Ludwig, Viewpoint: Time to Help Community Banks in Crisis, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 18, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 18298029.
37. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765 (2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C.S. § 5201); see also Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, The Financial Crisis: A Timeline of Events and Policy Actions, http://time
line.stlouisfed.org/pdf/CrisisTimeline.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2010) (outlining major
events of the Financial Crisis).
38. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 101(a)(3)(A).
39. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 101(a)(1).
40. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 3(9)(B). Although "financial
instrument" is not a defined term in the statute, discussions of the term on the House
floor indicate that "financial instrument" includes "capital instruments of an
institution such as common and preferred stock[.]" See, 154 CONG. REC. 10763 (daily
ed. Oct. 3,2008) (Statement of Rep. Frank).
41. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP
Capital Purchase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.tre
as.gov/press/releases/hpl207.htm.
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A. The Capital Purchase Program Generally
The CPP, as it was first announced in October of 2008, was
created to inject capital into the country's largest financial
institutions. To accomplish this, the Treasury would purchase
shares of preferred stock in participating institutions.4  The
Treasury initially set aside $250 billion for this program, and at the
time of its announcement, nine large financial institutions had
committed to the program, taking up roughly half of the program's
initial budget." The program was used extensively over the next
eight months; by mid-June 2009, the Treasury purchased almost
$200 billion worth of preferred stock in financial institutions of all
sizes .45
To be approved for receipt of CPP funds, qualified
financial institutions were required to submit an application to
46their primary regulator. Each institution approved to receive
funds was eligible to issue preferred stock equal to between one
and three percent of that institution's risk-weighted assets.47
Participating institutions must pay dividends on the preferred
stock in the amount of five percent per year for the first five years
that the institution holds the preferred stock and nine percent per
year thereafter.4 8 The availability of quick capital infusions at what




45. See OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM
TRANSACTIONS REPORT: CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM, Jan. 4, 2010, available at
http://financialstability.gov./docs/transaction-reports/1-610%20Transactions%20
Report %20as%20of%201-4-10.pdf.
46. TARP CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM, SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK AND
WARRANTS: SUMMARY OF SENIOR PREFERRED TERMS, http://financialstability.gov/
docs/CPP/termsheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2010) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF SENIOR
PREFERRED]. Qualified financial institutions include: (1) U.S. banks and savings
associations; and (2) U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Savings and Loan
Companies so long as the Savings and Loan Company "engages solely or
predominately in activities that are permitted for financial holding companies[.]" Id.
at 1.
47. SUMMARY OF SENIOR PREFERRED, supra note 46. There is also a limit of $25
billion although this is irrelevant to community banks. See id.
48. SUMMARY OF SENIOR PREFERRED, supra note 46, at 2.
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attractive to community bankers.49 In fact, many bankers took
money largely because of the low cost of the capital compared to
the alternatives .
In addition to required dividends, institutions participating
in the CPP must issue warrants to the Treasury to buy their
common stock." For public companies, the amount of the
warrants is equal to fifteen percent of the Treasury's original CPP
investment divided by the exercise price.52 The exercise price is
defined as the average stock price of the company for the twenty
day period prior to initial approval to participate in the CPP.
53
The original application deadline for banks to apply for
CPP funds was in November 2008; however, the application period
for CPP funds was extended until November 21, 2009 for small
banks. 4 Only the smallest community banks, those with $500
million in assets or less, were eligible to apply.55 This second phase
of the CPP also offered participants more favorable terms than the
original program including the right to issue preferred stock up to
five percent of risk-weighted assets compared to a cap of three
percent under the original program.56 Additionally, participants
were only required to issue warrants to accompany the preferred
stock up to three percent of the bank's risk-weighted assets instead
of issuing warrants to match all of the preferred stock issued
through the program.57 Participants in the first round of the CPP
49. See, e.g., Interview with Kim Price, CEO, Citizens South Banking Corp., in
Gastonia, N.C. (Sept. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Interview with Kim Price] (noting the
low cost of capital available through CPP).
50. See, e.g., id. (estimating that alternatives to CPP would have cost at least
eleven to fourteen percent).
51. SUMMARY OF SENIOR PREFERRED, supra note 46.
52. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Warrant
Repurchase and Disposition Process for the Capital Purchase Program (June 26,
2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/CPP/Warrant-Statement.pdf.
53. Id.
54. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
REGARDING THE CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM (CPP) FOR SMALL BANKS, available






INNOVATIVE USE OF TARP FUNDS
that qualified for the second round could re-apply to receive the
additional permitted funds. s
B. The Capital Purchase Program and Community Banks
Initially, all of the institutions participating in the CPP were
large banks, but many community banks have since decided to
participate. 9 Non-economic costs associated with participation,
however, dissuaded many community banks from seeking funds
through the program and forced those that did participate to adopt
specialized programs to address those costs.
6 °
The Treasury stated that the purpose of the CPP was to
"inject much-needed capital into the system" by "increasing the
capital base of an array of healthy, viable institutions, enabling
them to lend to consumers and businesses."A' These goals indicate
that the focus of the CPP was on consumers rather than on banks.
Thus, the CPP was not intended to be a "bailout" for banks but
rather entrusted healthy banks with the ability to facilitate the flow
of credit to consumers.62 Necessarily, regulation of the CPP sought
to protect consumers, but banks that participated in the CCP were
forced to balance the interests of the bank with those of the
consumers because of heavy regulation of CPP funds,
requirements for participation in the CPP, and the public stigma
associated with TARP.63
58. See id.
59. See OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM
TRANSACTIONS REPORT: CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM, Jan. 4, 2010, available at
http://financialstability.gov./docs/transaction-reports/1-610%20Transactions%20
Report%20as%20of%201-4-10.pdf.
60. See, David G. Murray & William H. Quirk III, Capital Purchase Program
Funds: Thanks, but Maybe No Thanks, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP PUBLICATIONS, June
23, 2009, available at http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications article.aspx?ArticleKey
=1524; Deborah Solomon, More Banks to TARP: Thanks, but No Thanks, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 31, 2009, at B3.
61. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Factsheet on Capital Purchase Program,
http://financialstability.gov./roadtostability/CPPfactsheet.htm (last visited on Jan. 7,
2010) [hereinafter CPP Factsheet].
62. Id.
63. See Murray, et al., supra note 60; Solomon, supra note 60.
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1. Regulation
In addition to paying dividends and issuing warrants to buy
common stock, each participant in the CPP must comply with
several conditions imposed by the Treasury.6' Among these
conditions are restrictions on dividends, share repurchases, andS61
executive compensation. Moreover, a standard term in CPP
contracts provides that the Treasury may "unilaterally amend any
provision... to the extent required to comply with any changes
after the Signing Date in applicable federal statutes., 66 This open-
ended provision leaves participants at the mercy of lawmakers and
made many bankers wary of participation in the CPP because of
the possibility that additional conditions would attach to their
TARP investment.67
The Treasury has also instituted stronger methods of
monitoring the uses of the CPP funds at participating banks.68
Early Treasury press releases and descriptions of the program
64. See SUMMARY OF SENIOR PREFERRED, supra note 46; see also Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Publ L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008)
(codified at 12 U.S.C.S. § 5201) (outlining general requirements for participation);
Capital Purchase Contract: Citizens South Banking Corporation, Dec. 12, 2008,
available at http://financialstability.gov/docs/agreements/06032009/Citizens%20South
%20Banking%20Corporation.pdf (specifying specific conditions imposed on Citizens
South Bank upon receipt of CPP funds).
65. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Publ L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765 (2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C.S. § 5201); SUMMARY OF SENIOR PREFERRED,
supra note 46. Restrictions on executive compensation do not seem to be an issue at
community banks that typically pay executives more modest salaries. For example,
the compensation package of Kim Price, CEO of Citizens South Bank, comes in well
under the restrictions imposed by the CPP. See Steven Pearlstein, Big Lessons in
Finance From a Little Bank You've Never Heard Of, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2009, at
D01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/10/
AR2009021003583.html.
66. See, e.g., Capital Purchase Contract: Citizens South Banking Corporation, at
34, Dec. 12, 2008, available at http://financialstability.gov./docs/agreements/06032009/
Citizens%20South%20Banking%20Corporation.pdf. One such change was the
passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which most
notably changed requirement regarding executive compensation of TARP
participants. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R. 1, 111th Cong.
(2009).
67. See Murray, et al., supra note 60; Solomon, supra note 60.
68. See Troubled Assets Relief Program Capital Purchase Program All
Participants Monthly Report, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,437 (Sept. 22, 2009); Troubled Assets
Relief Program Capital Purchase Program Monthly Survey, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,770 (July
23, 2009).
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seemed to imply that CPP funds should be used to promote
lending programs, but there was very little formal regulation of the
use of CPP money.69 As a result, many participants did not limit
their use of funds to programs directed toward increasing lending
opportunities.0  A survey taken of program participants in
November 2008 showed that while most participants planned to
use funds in lending programs, eleven percent of participants
planned to use funds to shore up their capital position, twenty-
eight percent planned to use funds to defend against future losses,
and eight percent planned to use funds to acquire other banks.71
Since that time efforts to monitor participants have grown.72 Early
monitoring focused on the largest banks, but has expanded to
include quarterly reports from all participants in the CPP.73 A
more recent proposal would increase monitoring efforts by
requiring each participant to submit monthly reports on their uses
of CPP funds.74 These reporting requirements place significant
administrative burdens on community banks with limited
resources.
2. Exclusive Participation
The requirement that a financial institution be deemed
"healthy" in order to participate in the CPP has created concern
69. See CPP Factsheet, supra note 61; Aaron Lorenzo, Banks Lining Up to Get
Capital Infusions, Paulson Says; Home Loan Impact Expected, BNA BANKING
DAILY, Oct. 21, 2008, available at 10/21/2008 BBD d15 (citing Secretary Paulson's
October 2 0th press briefing saying that banks "are expected to use any proceeds they
receive to increase lending rather than hoard the money.").
70. See Joyce E. Cutler, Community Banks Now More Likely To Use TARP
Funds, Survey Finds, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 4, 2008, available at 12/4/2008 BBD
d19.
71. See id.
72. See Troubled Assets Relief Program Capital Purchase Program All
Participants Monthly Report, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,437 (Sept. 22, 2009); Troubled Assets
Relief Program Capital Purchase Program Monthly Survey, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,770 (July
23, 2009).
73. See Cheyenne Hopkins, More Monitoring of Tarp's Uses Urged, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 2, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 1820881; Murray, et al., supra note
60.
74. Troubled Assets Relief Program Capital Purchase Program All Participants
Monthly Report, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,437 (Sept. 22, 2009).
2010]
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within the community banking industry.75 Many in the industry
believe that the CPP has the effect of widening the divide between
healthy and struggling community banks.76 Small, struggling banks
claim that they have been left to fail while the government has
saved banks deemed "too big to fail" through other TARP
programs and provided inexpensive capital to healthy community
banks through the CPP.77 In fact, this belief has led some bankers
to push for a new TARP program intended to help struggling
community banks, but such a program is very unlikely to occur.78
3. Public Stigma
A primary concern that many community banks have about
participation in the CPP is the public stigma that attaches to
institutions that take government funds. 79 Although the Treasury
has emphasized that the CPP is not a "bailout" and is only
available to healthy banks,8° many bankers believe that the general
public takes a different view. 8' For many bankers, concerns over
perceived weakness play a big role in deciding whether or not to
participate in the CPP.82 In fact, bankers who have decided to
participate in the program have often launched marketing
campaigns reassuring the communities in which they operate that
83they are healthy and ready to lend to qualified consumers. For
example, shortly after receiving TARP funds, Intermountain
Community Bancorp in Sandpoint, Idaho launched a "Powered by
75. See Barba, Making a Case to Give Tarp to Strugglers, supra note 36; Ludwig,
supra note 36.
76. See Barba, Making a Case to Give Tarp to Strugglers, supra note 36; Ludwig,
supra note 36.
77. See Barba, Making a Case to Give Tarp to Strugglers, supra note 36; Ludwig,
supra note 36.
78. See Barba, Making a Case to Give Tarp to Strugglers, supra note 35; Ludwig,
supra note 36.
79. See Marissa Fajt & Bonnie McGreer, Skepticism Over Tarp Revamp for Small
Banks, AM. BANKER, May 14, 2009; Interview with Kim Price, supra note 49.
80. CPP Factsheet, supra note 61.
81. See, e.g. Fajt, et al., supra note 79; Interview with Kim Price, supra note 49.
82. Fajt, et al., supra note 79; Robin Sidel, Small Banks Not Shying From TARP,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2009, at B1.
83. See Steve Garmhausen, The Big Outreach: Credit Crisis Spurs Grassroots
Revival, AM. BANKER, April 28, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 794522; Sidel, supra
note 82.
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Community" initiative to make consumers in the communities it
serves aware that the bank was ready to lend.84 Intermountain
worked with community leaders and volunteers to create various
lending opportunities primarily aimed at local businesses and
organizations. 5 By involving the local community in efforts to
promote lending, Intermountain was able to instill public
confidence in the bank's health.86  Many bankers that have
proactively addressed the negative public opinion associated with
TARP have reported positive feedback and support from their
communities.87
By contrast, some industry commentators believe that
banks that did not take CPP funds are seen as weak.88 They argue
that the CPP provides an easy way for the public to distinguish the
"winners" from the "losers" because the Treasury only allows
banks deemed healthy to participate.89 Because disbursement of
CPP funds is conditioned on a bank's financial health, failure to
participate may reflect negatively on a bank's financial position,
but any such assumption is untrue.90 Some banks chose not to
participate because of prohibitive costs and so did not submit an
application for review.9' Many other factors go into a bank's
decision to participate in the CPP, and a banks decision not to
participate should not be interpreted as an indictment on the
health of the bankY.
84. Garmhausen, supra note 83.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id.; Sidel, supra note 82.
88. Robert Barba, The Real 'Scarlet Letter' Was Not Receiving Tarp, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 18, 2009 available at 2009 WLNR 18298027.
89. Id.
90. See CPP Factsheet, supra note 61; SUMMARY OF SENIOR PREFERRED, supra
note 46; Solomon, supra note 60.
91. See Mercer Capital's Financial Institutions Group, Capital Purchase Program
Handbook: Executive Summary, at 2, Nov. 2008, available at http://208.112.39.119/
media/File/MercerCapitalCPPExecutiveSummary.pdf; Murray, et al., supra note
60; Solomon, supra note 60.
92. See Mercer Capital's Financial Institutions Group, Capital Purchase Program
Handbook: Executive Summary, at 2, Nov. 2008, available at http://208.112.39.119/
media/File/MercerCapitalCPPExecutiveSummary.pdf; Murray, et al., supra note
60; Solomon, supra note 60.
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IV. THE CITIZENS SOUTH PROGRAM
A. Background on Citizens South Bank
Citizens South Bank is a small community bank
headquartered in Gastonia, North Carolina.93 The bank operates
fifteen local branches and, as of June 30, 2009, had approximately
$836 million of assets.94 Citizens South's participation in the CPP
is a particularly compelling example of the benefits of participation
because it realizes the Treasury's purpose in offering the program
to smaller banks by increasing available lending to local consumers
and businesses.95 Specifically, Citizens South Bank implemented a
96program geared towards stimulating the local housing market.
B. The Program
Citizens South decided to participate in the CPP, despite
being well-capitalized, because of the low cost of capital made
available through the program.9 Because healthy banks were
encouraged by the Treasury to participate, Kim Price, CEO of
Citizens South, initially believed that participation in the CPP
would bolster public opinion of the bank.98  Accordingly, in
February 2009, Citizens South became a participant in the CPP by
selling $20.5 million in senior preferred stock to the U.S.
Treasury. 99
93. Citizens South is a federally chartered savings bank and is owned by Citizens
South Banking Corporation, a publicly traded organization that is incorporated in
Delaware but has its headquarters in North Carolina. Office of Thrift Supervision
Institutional Profile: Citizens South Bank, http://www.ots.treas.gov/?p=Institution
Search&iid=02449 (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
94. Id.
95. See CPP Factsheet, supra note 61; SUMMARY OF SENIOR PREFERRED, supra
note 46.
96. See infra pp. 374-75 and notes 97-106.
97. Kim Price, CEO of Citizens South, notes that at the time the bank decided to
participate the cheapest form of capital that would have been available to his bank
would have cost between 11% and 14% interest annually, while the funds from the
CPP would not cost the bank half of that. Interview with Kim Price, supra note 49.
98. Price said that the overall impression was that the bank would be helping the
country by taking this money and increasing its lending. Interview with Kim Price,
supra note 49.
99. See Capital Purchase Contract: Citizens South Banking Corporation, Dec. 12,
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Upon receiving the CPP funds, Citizens South instituted a
lending program, the CPP Mortgage Program, aimed at
stimulating the local housing market.1°° The structure of the
lending program reflected Price's observations of the local
economy, the sources of the economic crisis, and a desire to keep
in line with the initial goals of the CPP.01 Builders and developers
who were customers of Citizens South1°2 could waive closing costs
in exchange for Citizens South's provision of low-cost home loans
to potential homebuyers. 13 The goal of the CPP Mortgage
Program was to stimulate demand for local housing by offering
favorable terms to potential homebuyers' °4 This in turn would
generate business for local real estate developers, builders, and
subcontractors that were customers of Citizens South by providing
them with the funds needed to service or repay outstanding loans
with the bank. 05 Finally, the repayment of builder and developer
loans would benefit Citizens South because it would allow the
bank to reduce the risk of its loan portfolio by replacing
commercial loans with safer home loans.1°6
C. The Results
Because local housing market trends have played such a
large role in the health of community banks, one way to examine
2008, available at http://financialstability.gov./docs/agreements/O6032009/Citizens%20
South%20Banking%20Corporation.pdf.
100. See Adam O'Daniel, Gastonia Banker's TARP Loans Win Fans Across the
United States, CHARLOTrE Bus. J., Feb. 27, 2009, available at http://charlotte.biz
journals.com/charlotte/stories/2009/03/02/storyl2.html; Pearlstein, supra note 65.
101. See Interview with Kim Price, supra note 49.
102. The program is only available through builders and developers that do
business with Citizens South and have agreed to participate in the program.
Currently about fifty builders in the area participate in the program. See id.
103. Under the initial terms of the program closing costs were paid for by the
builders and the bank offered homebuyers a 30-year mortgage with an introductory
interest rate of 3.5% which escalates to 5.5% after the first two years. At the time the
market rate was 5.5%. Since the introduction of the program market interest rates
have decreased and Citizens South has adjusted the rates of the mortgage to 2.875%
and 4.875% respectively to reflect the change in market rates. Citizens South
Website, http://www.citizenssouth.com, (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).
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the effectiveness of Citizens South's CPP Mortgage Program is to
compare its financial performance with banks operating in the
same locality.0 7  Two banks that are appropriate for this
comparison are First National Bank of Shelby, North Carolina
(First National) and CommunityOne Bank of Asheboro, North
Carolina (CommunityOne).'08
1. Set Up for Success
Citizens South was well-positioned to successfully deploy
the CPP funds. The local economy in which it operates fared
better in the economic crisis than other areas of the country.109
Furthermore, the bank's loan-loss reserves indicate that it
exercised conservative lending practices."0  From the second
quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009, Citizens South's
allowance for loan losses amounted to an average of 1.26% of total
loans compared to 1.39% for First National and 1.92% for
Communityune."' Citizen South's low ratio, when compared to
similar banks in the region, supports Mr. Price's assertion that
Citizens South did not get caught up in the real estate boom.'
2
Furthermore, Citizens South reported a 28.5% rise in allowance
for loan losses over the past year. 13  While some increase in
allowance for loan losses is expected given the economic
downturn, by comparison, First National's allowance for loan
losses rose by 44% over that time and CommunityOne's allowance
107. See infra pp. 376-78 and notes 109-131.
108. As of June 30, 2009 First National had total assets of approximately $1.04
billion and CommunityOne had total assets of approximately $2.2 billion. See FDIC
Institution Directory, http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/index.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2010)
(follow "Find Institutions" hyperlink, then search FDIC Certificate # 4910 and FDIC
Certificate # 4879 respectively).
109. See supra p. 364 and notes 22-27.
110. See FDIC Institution Directory, supra note 108; Dash, Failures of Small
Banks Grow, Straining FD.I.C. of Small Banks Grow, supra note 16; Hill, supra note
22.
111. See FDIC Institution Directory, http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/index.asp (last
visited Jan. 8, 2010) (follow "Find Institutions" hyperlink, then search FDIC
Certificate # 4910, FDIC Certificate # 4879, and FDIC Certificate # 28833).
112. Interview with Kim Price, supra note 49; see also Pearlstein, supra note 65.
113. FDIC Institution Directory, supra note 111.
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114rose by 95.5%. In general, loans made by Citizens South appear
to have been less risky than those made by its competitors.
2. Success of the Program
During the first seven months of its existence, the CPP
Mortgage Program generated about twenty additional loans that
would not have been made otherwise - a significant increase for a
bank that normally makes about seventy-five residential mortgage
loans per month."5 These additional loans brought in extra
business for the bank, and have enabled the bank to turn $6
million of non-performing assets into performing assets by
replacing commercial loans to struggling builders and developers
with residential loans for homebuyers." 6 However, the use of the
program has been lower than Price initially expected."7 He
believes the slow start is largely due to the continued slowdown in
the local housing market but unquestioningly believes that the
program has been a success.118
During the first two quarters of 2009, while the program
has been in effect, Citizens South's total loans have risen only
about .5% compared to 1.7% at First National and 2.2% at
CommunityOne." 9 Since Citizens South is offering the program
only through builders who already have loans outstanding at
Citizens South, the success of the program depends on the bank's
ability to move construction and commercial loans to the more
stable home mortgage loans.20 Thus, the increase in loans is better
examined by measuring the relative values of construction and
home mortgage loans over this time. Since the program was
implemented, Citizens South's construction and land development
loans decreased by nearly twenty-two percent.' Construction and
114. Id.




119. FDIC Institution Directory, supra note 111.
120. Interview with Kim Price, supra note 49.
121. See FDIC Institution Directory, http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/index.asp (last
visited Jan. 8, 2010) (follow "Find Institutions" hyperlink, then search FDIC
Certificate # 28833).
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land development loans at CommunityOne decreased by about 2.5
percent and at First National increased by 1.75 percent. 22 These
numbers imply that the program is doing what it was designed to
do: decreasing loans held by developers and putting them into the
hands of homeowners. 123
The success of the program has also generated goodwill as
a result of national media coverage.' 4 Price reports that in the first
sixty days after the initial media blitz, Citizens South took in about
$50 million in new deposits.125 This goodwill, however, has not had
a significant long-term impact on the bank when compared to
other local community banks.126 While Citizens South did have a
jump in deposits in the first quarter of 2009, the quarter in which
the program was announced, new deposits have trailed off since
that time.127 Citizens South has seen a growth of about 6% in total
deposits. Over the same period, deposit growth at First National
was 8.8% and nearly 8.9% at Community.129  While Citizens
South's rapid increase in deposit growth rate can be partly
attributed to the announcement of the CPP Mortgage Program
and the subsequent goodwill it produced, it appears that other
community banks have also experienced an increase in deposits.
13°
Increased deposits may indicate that consumers are leaving larger
banks for local banks that they perceive as more trustworthy
rather than illustrate the particularized impact of Citizens South's
131program.
122. Id.
123. Interview with Kim Price, supra note 49.
124. Id.; see O'Daniel, supra note 100; Pearlstein, supra note 65.
125. Interview with Kim Price, supra note 49.
126. FDIC Institution Directory, supra note 111.
127. FDIC Institution Directory, supra note 121
12& Id.
129. FDIC Institution Directory, supra note 111. Citizens South's total deposits
actually shrunk by .57% during the three quarters prior to the announcement of the
program. During that same time deposits grew at First National by 1.43% and at
Community by 1.97%. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Sisk, supra note 12.
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3. Direction for the Future
Despite the relative success of the program, in late October
2009, Citizens South announced that it would repay the funds
received from the CPP with the proceeds from a $30 million stock
offering. 32 Citizens South cited "negative public sentiment and
congressional intervention" as its reason for wanting to pay back
the money.3 3 As of that time, approximately $10 million of the
$20.5 million in CPP funds had been used for the CPP Mortgage
Program; however, Citizens South said that it would "honor [its]
commitment" and continue offering the program until the $20.5
million was used."4  Citizens South withdrew its stock offering
about a week after its announcement, finding that the "capital
markets [had] softened" after a disappointing third quarter for the
banking industry.135 Thus, Citizens South will likely continue to
participate in the CPP for the foreseeable future but will return to
the capital markets when conditions improve.
Although Citizens South's desire to repay the CPP funds
indicates that it no longer wants to remain a participant in the
CPP, it does not mean that its CPP Mortgage Program has been a
failure. The CPP was intended to be a short term program that
provided a quick injection of capital to open lines of credit to
consumers and businesses.36 This is evidenced by the stated goals
of the CPP as well as significant increases in dividend rates
required by preferred stock issued through the CPP.'37 Citizens
South's desire to repay its obligations under the CPP indicates
little more than an effort to remove itself from the costs of the
132. Daniel Jackson, Citizens South Hoping to Repay TARP with $30 Million




135. Daniel Jackson, Citizens South Cancels its Stock Offering, GASTON GAZETTE,
Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.gastongazette.com/news/south-39658-stock-offering.html.
136. CPP Factsheet, supra note 61; SUMMARY OF SENIOR PREFERRED, supra note
46.
137. For a discussion of the costs of the CPP, both economic and non-economic,
see supra Part III, and notes 37-92.
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program while its commitment to continue the CPP Mortgage
Program is evidence of that program's success.138
V. CONCLUSION
Citizens South illustrates how innovative products and
programs, like the CPP Mortgage Program, can harmonize the
goals of the CPP with the interests of participating banks.
Through its CPP Mortgage Program, Citizens South accomplished
the goals of the CPP by making low-cost credit available to
consumers. 9 Moreover, it created value for the bank by replacing
underperforming construction and development loans with less
risky home mortgage loans.1 ° Citizens South's program was a
success for all involved: the builders and developers who were able
to generate new business and pay down their loans, potential
homeowners who were able to take advantage of attractive
interest rates and no closing costs, and for the bank which was able
to reduce risk in its loan portfolio as well as create new loans. 4 '
When faced with a decision about how to increase lending with the
CPP funds, Citizens South reached out to its own customer base to
create a program that stimulated the housing market, effectively
utilizing the most significant competitive advantage of community
banks: their relationship with the communities they serve. 42
PATRICK D. CRAIG
138. For a discussion of the costs of the CPP, both economic and non-economic,
see supra Part III, and notes 37-92.
139. See supra Part IV.
140. See supra Part IV.
141. See supra Part IV.
142 See supra Part IV.
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